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Foreword—King v. Burwell Symposium:
Comments on the Commentaries (and on
Some Elephants in the Room)
David Gamage
When the Editors of the Pepperdine Law Review asked me to pen a
response commentary to the essays submitted for their symposium on the
King v. Burwell case, I agreed only with some reluctance. As some readers
of this symposium volume may already be aware, I took an academic leave
during the time period extending from the summer of 2010 to the summer of
2012 to accept a position at the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy.
The portfolio of my Treasury position included the Regulations for Internal
Revenue Code § 36B (Section 36B)—the Regulations that were being
challenged in the King v. Burwell1 case. I must thus clarify at the outset that
nothing I write in this response commentary should be taken as indicative of
the views of the Treasury Department, the Obama Administration, or anyone
other than myself.
The thrust of my response commentary will be to praise the submitted
essays for their excellence and insightfulness, but to suggest that the
submitted essays nonetheless might benefit from focusing more on the role
of the political mobilization that resulted in the King v. Burwell dispute.
The essays submitted for this symposium volume largely concentrate on
the implications of the King v. Burwell decision for the future of Chevron
deference, both in tax and non-tax contexts. Accordingly, Professor
Johnson’s essay argues that Chevron deference “is now receding in tax”2 and
that, more generally, we are now seeing the Chevron doctrine’s “fall in tax
and elsewhere; a fall in substantive significance, although perhaps not
frequency of citation.”3
Professor Johnson argues persuasively, yet some of the other submitted
essays express greater uncertainty about the implications of the King v.
Burwell decision for the future of Chevron deference. For instance,

1. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
2. Steve R. Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days to King and
Beyond, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 19 (2015).
3. Id. at 26.
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Professors Hoffer and Walker argue that it remains to be seen “whether the
Chief in King v. Burwell intended to cause a sea change in administrative
law or was thinking like a tax lawyer and crafting a major questions doctrine
that is good for tax only.”4
Notably, Professor Lederman, Mr. Dugan, and Professor Hickman all
see a divergence between Chief Justice Roberts and some of the other
Justices on what the future of Chevron deference should be. Lederman and
Dugan discuss the prior disagreement between the Chief Justice and Justice
Scalia in the earlier case of City of Arlington v. FCC,5 concluding that the
King v. Burwell decision may signify that “Chief Justice Robert’s ‘massive
revision’ to Chevron, decried by Justice Scalia in City of Arlington, may be
gaining traction” and that “[i]t will be interesting to see how the doctrine
evolves in the coming Terms.”6 Along similar lines, Professor Hickman
agrees that the King v. Burwell decision is a product of Chief Justice
Robert’s goal of revising the Chevron doctrine.7 However, Professor
Hickman argues that “it is unlikely that a majority of the Court agrees
wholeheartedly with Chief Justice Roberts’s preferred view of Chevron’s
scope.”8 Nevertheless, Professor Hickman wonders whether lower courts
might be influenced by the King v. Burwell decision and so give less
deference to Treasury regulations in future cases.9 This concern is expressed
even more strongly by Professor Aprill, who predicts (with regret and with
hope that her prediction will prove to be in error) that the King v. Burwell
decision will embolden the Tax Court in particular to give less deference to
Treasury Regulations going forward.10
Professor Aprill’s concern is amplified by her view that “[t]he Supreme
Court in King v. Burwell gave no guidance as to when a law involves issues
of such economic or political significance that judicial, rather than
administrative, interpretation is needed.”11 As Professors Hoffer and Walker
explain, the King v. Burwell decision “broke new ground in administrative
law, ruling that Chevron deference does not apply to questions such as this

4. Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L.
REV. 33, 46 (2015).
5. Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does it Portend for
Chevron’s Domain?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 79–80 (2015).
6. Id. at 81.
7. See Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 2015
PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57–58 (2015).
8. Id. at 53; see also id. at 66–67.
9. Id. at 70–71.
10. Ellen P. Aprill, King v. Burwell and Tax Court Review of Regulations, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 6,
17–18 (2015).
11. Id. at 17.
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one that are of ‘deep economic and political significance.’”12
Ultimately, then, what does this new limitation to Chevron deference
mean or stand for? In particular, what might constitute a question of “deep
economic and political significance” so that Chevron deference might not
apply under this new limitation?
I view myself as a tax lawyer and a scholar of tax law and policy, not as
a Court watcher. I will thus refrain from making predictions about the future
of the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it seems to
me that there are some metaphorical “elephants in the room”—that is, underanalyzed aspects of the King v. Burwell dispute that likely shaped the
decision and that may influence its future impact.
Without question, I found all of the submitted Essays to be excellent,
and I learned a great deal from their thoughtful commentary. Yet I remain
doubtful that the King v. Burwell decision is best understood as part of a
larger battle over the nature of Chevron deference in general, rather than,
instead, as a particularized response to a highly political challenge to the
signature legislative achievement of the Obama Administration.
Put another way, I suspect that key to understanding the King v. Burwell
decision are some highly political “elephants” in the room, and, to mix
metaphors, some highly political “donkeys” in the room as well.
In this, I differ somewhat from Professor Grewal, whose essay questions
why tax professors were not more engaged in analyzing the King v. Burwell
dispute prior to the Supreme Court’s decision (and this symposium on that
decision).13 I certainly agree with the main thrust of Professor Grewal’s
argument that tax professors should be more engaged in cases like this,
especially seeing as the intersections of taxation and health care are likely to
be a growth area over the coming decades.14 However, I view the political
nature of the King v. Burwell dispute as the primary explanation for tax
professors’ reticence, even though I agree with Professor Grewal’s argument
that this does not justify that reticence.15
The King v. Burwell dispute has sometimes been framed as a conflict
between the literal wording of portions of section 36B and the broader
structure and purpose of the Affordable Care Act. However, as Darien
Shanske and I have argued previously, the literal wording of Section 36B is
12. Hoffer & Walker, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489
(2015)).
13. See Andy S. Grewal, King v. Burwell: Where Were the Tax Professors?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV.
48 (2015).
14. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare
Reform: Why Further Reforms are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and ModerateIncome Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669 (2012) (discussing intersections of taxation and health care).
15. Grewal, supra note 13, at 51–53.
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actually in accord with the government’s position once it is recognized that
the term “Exchange” is defined by the statute as a term of art.16 Moreover,
even were this not so, the Supreme Court has long held that the literal
wording of terms in a provision of the Internal Revenue Code must give way
when in strong tension with the provision’s overall structure and purpose.
As the Court wrote in the famous case of Crane v. Commissioner, taught in
most introductory courses on tax law, “It was thought to be decisive that one
section of the Act must be construed so as not to defeat the intention of
another or to frustrate the Act as a whole. . . .”17 Since the beginning days of
the income tax, the Treasury Department has used its authority granted by
Congress to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of” the tax law18 and has frequently issued Regulations pursuant to that
authority that depart far more dramatically from the literal wording of Code
provisions than was the case with Section 36B.19
Consequently, if the Treasury Department was correct in its view as to
the structure and purpose of the disputed language of section 36B, then I do
not think there can be any real doubt that Treasury had the authority to write
its interpretation into the Section 36B Regulations. To hold otherwise would
be to overturn the history of how the income tax laws have been
administered in this country.
Of course, those who supported the challenge to the Treasury
Department’s Regulation espoused a different and competing view of the
structure and purpose of the disputed language of Section 36B. This
competing view understood Congress as having limited the availability of
the premium tax credits to only States that established their own Exchanges
and having done so for the purpose of coercing the States to establish their
own Exchanges.
Without delving further into the nature and origins of these two
competing visions, I think most commentators who followed the dispute
would agree that the advocates of these competing visions grouped into two
distinct camps that evolved to form two separate and incompatible epistemic
communities. Accordingly, the debates between these two camps were then
largely based on these camps having different worldviews and social
16. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax Credits on
the Federal Exchanges, 71 STATE TAX NOTES 229 (2014).
17. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
18. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
19. For instance, consider the “check-the-box regulations” as discussed in Gregg D. Polsky, Can
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185 (2004), or the regulations on the
deductibility of education expenses as discussed in Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Education Costs:
Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to Take Your Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1
(1997).
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networks rather than being based on more lawyerly analysis.
I suspect that it is for this reason that Chief Justice Roberts felt
compelled to uphold the Treasury Department’s Regulation without granting
Chevron deference. If the Chief Justice agreed with the Treasury
Department as to the purpose and structure of the disputed language of
Section 36B (as I am confident that he did), then the only plausible
interpretation of the disputed language is that premium tax credits should be
available in all States. But deference to the Treasury Department could not
be the reason for upholding this interpretation. After all, what if the
Treasury Department had been controlled by the other epistemic community
with its different worldview?
It is perhaps regrettable that the King v. Burwell decision did not better
clarify what constitutes a question of “deep economic and political
significance” for the purposes of Chevron deference. It now remains to be
seen how this notion might evolve through future cases. The insightful
essays in this symposium volume will undoubtedly help guide that future
evolution. Nevertheless, I think we should keep in mind the special political
nature of the King v. Burwell dispute. It might be that what ultimately made
this a question of deep economic and political significance was not anything
inherent to the content or subject matter of the disputed provision itself but
rather was the political mobilization of epistemic communities around
interpretations based on incompatible worldviews that occurred subsequent
to the passage of the legislation.

5

